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HE Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act
("DTPA") 1 was enacted in 1973 "to protect consumers against
false, misleading and deceptive business practices, unconscionable
actions, and breaches of warranty and to provide efficient and economical
procedures to secure such protection. ' '2 Although the Texas Legislature
enacted two sets of amendments in 2001 and additional amendments in
2003, there still are no reported decisions addressing those changes.
This Survey covers significant developments under the DTPA from No-
vember 1, 2003 through October 31, 2004. Noteworthy decisions during
the Survey period address consumer status, laundry list violations, dam-
ages, and reliance.
II. CONSUMER STATUS
In order to bring a DTPA claim, a plaintiff must be a "consumer" as
that term is defined by the statute. 3 To qualify as a consumer, a plaintiff
must be an individual who seeks or acquires by purchase or lease goods
or services; those goods or services must form the basis of the plaintiff's
complaint.4 Consumer status under the DTPA is dependent upon show-
ing that the plaintiff's relationship to the transaction entitles him to re-
lief.5 Whether a plaintiff qualifies for such status is a question of law
when the facts underlying the determination of consumer status are
undisputed. 6
The assignability of a DTPA claim based on the breach of expressed
warranty is an issue that was discussed in Summer 2002 Survey in PPG
Industries, Inc. v. JMB/Houston Centers Partners Ltd. Partnership.7 The
original building owner hired a window manufacturer to install windows
in the building. One-fourth of the windows were defective, and the man-
ufacturer was required to replace them pursuant to a warranty. Several
years later, the original owner sold the building and assigned his warranty
and DTPA claims to the purchaser. When more window problems devel-
oped, the new owner brought claims against the window manufacturer.
The trial court entered a jury verdict in favor of the new owner and the
1. TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41 et seq. (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2004-05).
2. Id. § 17.44(a).
3. See id. § 17.50.
4. Id. § 17.45(4); Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349, 351-52 (Tex.1987) (citing Sherman Simon Enter., Inc. v. Lorae Servs. Corp., 724 S.W.2d 13, 15 (Tex.1987); Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc., 618 S.W.2d 535, 539 (Tex. 1981)).5. Amstadt v. United States Brass Corp., 919 S.W.2d 644, 650 (Tex. 1996); see alsoSanchez v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 187 F.3d 486, 491 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that a "DTPA
claim requires an underlying consumer transaction; there must be a nexus between the
consumer, the transaction, and the defendant's conduct") (citing Amstadt, 919 S.W.2d at
650).
6. Vinson & Elkins v. Moran, 946 S.W.2d 381, 406 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1997, writ. dism'd by agr.).
7. 146 S.W.3d 79 (Tex. 2004).
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Houston Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, joining several other
courts holding DTPA claims are assignable'
The Texas Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that any
DTPA claims that the original owner of the building had against the win-
dow manufacturer could not be assigned to the purchaser. 9 The court
reviewed the history and goals of the DTPA, finding that the DTPA's
primary goal is to protect consumers by encouraging them to bring con-
sumer complaints.10 The court reasoned that assigning DTPA claims
would defeat the purpose of the statute, which is to encourage consumers
to bring complaints themselves.'1 Allowing DTPA claims to be assigned,
according to the court, would allow large companies to assert DTPA
claims by stepping into the shoes of qualifying consumers. 12 First, the
court found that the treble-damage provisions of the DTPA were in-
tended to motivate consumers, not those considering litigation for com-
mercial profit.13 In the court's words, "the personal and punitive aspects
of DTPA claims cannot be squared with a rule allowing them to be as-
signed as if they were mere property. ' 14 Additionally, consumers would
be at a severe negotiating disadvantage to entrepreneurs willing to buy
DTPA claims. Thus, allowing DTPA claims to be assigned could result in
consumers being deceived twice. 15 Finally, the court reasoned that con-
sumers may not be sophisticated enough to understand the claims they
are assigning.16 In the case of a general assignment included in contrac-
tual boilerplate language, consumers may not know they have DTPA
claims when they assign them.
17
The decision does not fully resolve the issue of assignability and
survivability of DTPA claims. Although the court held that DTPA war-
ranty claims may not be assigned, it specifically did not decide issues of
survivability or assignment of other, "pure" DTPA claims.18 The court
also declined to decide whether DTPA claims survive to a consumer's
heirs.19 Additionally, the court held that its ruling does not prohibit equi-
table assignments, such as a contingent-fee interest assigned to a con-
sumer's attorney. 20
In Roof Systems, Inc. v. Johns Manville Corporation,21 a roofing sub-
contractor sought consumer status in connection with a roofing project.
Roof Systems received a subcontract to install roofs on two schools. The
8. Id. at 83.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 84.
11. Id. at 85.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 82.
15. Id. at 86.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 91.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. 130 S.W.3d 430 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet. h.).
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subcontract required Roof Systems to provide a ten-year warranty on the
roof systems as a condition to final payment. Johns Manville Corporation("JMC") provided roofing materials for the schools. JMC asserted that it
would not issue its "Gold Shield Roofing System Guaranty" unless the
roof systems were installed by a JMC-certified installer; Roof Systems
was not so certified. Roof Systems attempted to arrange for a JMC-certi-
fied installer to install the roof systems as a sub-subcontractor. The par-
ties disagreed as to whether JMC approved this arrangement. It was
undisputed that, prior to resolving the approval question, Roof Systems
received written notice from the general contractor that it was contracting
with another roofing company, because Roof Systems failed to provide a
written warranty acknowledgment. 22
JMC moved for summary judgment, arguing in part that Roof Systems
was not a consumer, because its complaint was based upon JMC's refusal
to give a warranty and not based upon any goods or services sought or
acquired from JMC. Roof Systems responded only that it sought to ac-
quire roofing materials but did not address the second part of the test-
whether the goods or services formed the basis of its complaint.23 The
trial court granted JMC's motion, and on appeal, the Houston Court of
Appeals held that "[a] refusal to sell goods or services is not a complaint
based upon the goods or services for purposes of DTPA consumer sta-
tus."' 24 Roof Systems' DTPA claim was not based upon the terms or the
breach of a warranty, but on JMC's refusal to issue a warranty.25 The
court held that such a claim was not based upon any goods or services
that Roof Systems sought or acquired from JMC and that as a matter of
law Roof Systems was not a DTPA consumer.26
In Jabri v. Alsayyed,2 7 the lessee of a convenience store sued the owner
and his corporation for fraud and violations of the DTPA. The corpora-
tion operated Jabri's convenience stores and leased one of its stores to
Alsayyed. Jabri told Alsayyed that the store was an ongoing business
with a good consumer base that would generate a profit of about $10,000
per month. Alsayyed did not realize the profits promised by Jabri. Thejury found that both Jabri and his corporation knowingly engaged in an
unconscionable course of action that was a producing cause of damages
to Alsayyed. The jury also found that Alsayyed suffered mental anguish
damages as a result of Jabri and the corporation's actions. 28
On appeal, Jabri and his corporation argued that the trial court erred in
upholding the jury's award of damages because Alsayyed was not a
22. Id. at 433-34.
23. Id. at 440.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 441. Roof Systems argued for the first time on appeal that the warranty was
an integral, inseparable part of the roofing materials transaction, but the court refused to
consider the argument because it was not raised before the trial court. Id. at 440 n.19.27. 145 S.W.3d 660 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet. h.).
28. Id. at 665.
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DTPA consumer.29 In evaluating Alsayyed's consumer status, the Hous-
ton Court of Appeals examined whether his objective was the purchase
or lease of a good or service.30 The DTPA excludes claims based on
transactions conveying intangible property rights.3 1 Appellants argued
that Alsayyed's DTPA claim was based on his purchase of the goodwill of
a business, which is an intangible.3 2 The court disagreed, finding that Al-
sayyed not only purchased the store's goodwill, but also purchased the
inventory and services associated with operating the store.3 3 Because
goods and services were an objective of the transaction, and not merely




In addition to establishing consumer status, a DTPA plaintiff must
show that a "false, misleading, or deceptive act," breach of warranty, un-
conscionable action, or course of action occurred and that such conduct
was the producing cause of the plaintiff's damage.
3 5
A. LAUNDRY LIST CLAIMS
DTPA section 17.46(b) contains, in twenty-seven subparts, a nonexclu-
sive list of actions that constitute "false, misleading or deceptive acts"
under the statute.3 6 Plaintiffs invoking these "laundry list" claims are
generally not required to prove or plead the defendant's state of mind or
intent to deceive. 37 Several significant cases involving laundry list claims
were decided during the Survey period.
The plaintiff in Cendant Mobility Services Corp. v. Falconer38 pur-
chased his home from a relocation company selling the property for the
former owner. After a severe drought, the plaintiff saw damage to inte-
rior and exterior walls and floors as well as serious and widespread struc-
tural flaws. He sued the relocation company, alleging that it had failed to
disclose that the home's foundation had shown evidence of past substan-
tial movement and provided only a portion of the relevant engineer's re-
port. The trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff on a jury verdict
and the defendant appealed.3 9
The Texarkana Court of Appeals reversed and rendered a take nothing






35. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(1)-(3) (Vernon 2003).
36. § 17.46(b).
37. Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682, 689 (Tex. 1980). Several subsections do
explicitly involve an element of scienter. See, e.g., TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN.
§§ 17.46(b)(9), (10), (13), (16), (17) & (24) (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2004-05).
38. 135 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2004, no pet. h.).
39. Id. at 350-51.
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judgment.40 The evidence at trial established that the defendant provided
the plaintiff with a report that specifically stated, "The foundation shows
evidence of a substantial amount of movement in the past."' 41 Despite
the plaintiff's admission that he received and initialed the relevant por-
tions of the report, he maintained that he was misled by the seller's agent,
because she selectively informed him of certain portions of the prior own-
ers' disclosure and the report.42 The court held that the seller's agent had
no duty to explain the disclosures or reports and that the information in
those documents was clear and unambiguous. 43 Absent evidence of
fraud, the parties to a contract have an obligation to read what they sign.
The plaintiff failed to present evidence of an affirmative misrepresenta-
tion, so the court held that there was no evidence that the seller failed to
disclose information in an attempt to fraudulently induce the plaintiff to
contract. 44
In Allstate Texas Lloyds v. Mason,45 homeowners sued Allstate Texas
Lloyds claiming that foundation damage to the home was covered under
their homeowners' insurance policy. Allstate hired an engineer who in-
spected the house and determined that the damage was caused not by a
plumbing leak, which would have been covered, but by subsurface drain-
age problems. Allstate denied coverage and the homeowners sued for
breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, un-
conscionable conduct, and DTPA violations. The jury found in favor of
the homeowners and found that the DTPA violations had been commit-
ted knowingly and Allstate appealed. 46
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals reversed the DTPA claim.47 The
court held that the engineer hired by Allstate conducted an adequate in-
vestigation and that, based on the evidence available to Allstate, there
was no evidence suggesting that the engineer's investigation was unrelia-
ble or that Allstate acted unreasonably in relying on that investigation in
denying coverage.48 Thus, Allstate did not make any misrepresentations
about coverage or unreasonably refuse to pay a claim, and the jury's ver-
dict on the DTPA claim could not stand.49
Barnett v. Coppell North Texas Court, Ltd.50 arose from an attempt to
build a gymnastics facility. The Lewises contracted with Barnett to build
the North Texas Family & Sports Complex and secured a loan from Leg-
40. Id. at 351.
41. Id. at 352.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 354.
44. Id.; see also E.R. Dupuis Concrete Co. v. Penn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 137 S.W.3d 311,
323 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2004, no pet. h.) (denying relief on claim of failure to disclose
for lack of evidence).
45. 123 S.W.3d 690 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, no pet.).
46. Id. at 696-97.
47. Id. at 706.
48. Id. at 705-06.
49. Id. at 706-07.
50. 123 S.W.3d 804 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, pet. denied).
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acy Bank on the project. Barnett began construction in the summer of
1998 and walked off the unfinished job during the summer of 1999. Leg-
acy Bank sued the Lewises and Barnett and foreclosed on the property.
The Lewises cross-claimed against Barnett who answered and filed a
cross-claim against the Lewises. The Bank's claims were resolved and the
Barnett/Lewis claims were tried to a jury, which found for the Lewises. 51
Barnett appealed, arguing in part that the evidence was legally and fac-
tually insufficient to support the jury's findings of DTPA violations.52
The Dallas Court of Appeals held that there was sufficient evidence of a
DTPA violation.53 Specifically, David Lewis testified that he relied on
Barnett for the management and construction of the project, that "Bar-
nett promised 'three times the facility for one and a half times the amount
of money' in a more desirable location," and that Barnett led Lewis to
believe that the contractual amount was "more than adequate to build
this project. '54 Barnett guaranteed he would finish the project for a cer-
tain sum even if costs increased and represented that the building would
be completed in six months and would be of "great" quality.55 Lewis also
testified that Barnett was hired because of his representations and that
the Lewises relied on those representations. 56 The Dallas Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the verdict on the DTPA claim, holding that the evidence
supporting the jury findings was not so weak as to be clearly wrong and
unjust. 57
In Rosas v. Hatz, 58 home purchasers sued a realtor and the sellers for
breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, fraud, and DTPA viola-
tions after the purchasers discovered undisclosed electrical and plumbing
problems. The realtor filed a motion for summary judgment raising both
traditional and no evidence grounds. The trial court granted the motion
on the DTPA claims without specifying the basis of its ruling.59 The pur-
chasers appealed, and the Waco Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded.60
In response to the realtor's no evidence summary judgment motion, the
purchasers produced evidence that included the realtor's deposition testi-
mony.61 According to the realtor's deposition, the renter of the home
told the realtor "her water bills were high and she thought there was a
leak."'62 The purchasers testified that the realtor did not disclose the in-
formation regarding the leak, but instead represented that the house had
51. Id. at 813.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 822.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 823.
57. Id.
58. 147 S.W.3d 560 (Tex. App.-Waco 2004, no pet. h.).
59. Id. at 562.





been re-wired and fit with new plumbing. That statement, in combination
with the evidence that the renter told the realtor of a leak, created a fact
issue as to whether the realtor knew of the problems with the home and
withheld that information.6 3 The court of appeals held that the trial court
erred in granting the summary judgment motion, because a fact issue ex-
isted as to whether the realtor's statements were affirmative representa-
tions of false information. 64
The plaintiff in Tolpo v. Decordova65 sued his former attorney for legal
malpractice, breach of contract, fee forfeiture, and violations of the
DTPA. Tolpo alleged that his attorney negligently prepared and drafted
a contract for unimproved property. The attorney moved for summary
judgment on the DTPA claims, arguing that Tolpo's claims were merely
restated claims for legal malpractice. 66 The trial court entered summary
judgment in favor of the attorney, and the Beaumont Court of Appeals
affirmed. 67
The attorney used a pre-printed form and followed the client's instruc-
tions in preparing the contract. The earnest money contract, however,
did not address the issue of mineral reservations and easements. 68 The
court found that Tolpo did not produce evidence that the attorney's ac-
tions failed to meet the standard of care for a reasonably prudent attor-
ney.69 Specifically, Tolpo did not contend that the attorney was aware
that he was excluding a contract term or that the attorney affirmatively
misrepresented the effect of the contract. 70 Tolpo's DTPA claim, accord-
ing to the court, was merely a restated claim for legal malpractice.7 1 The
court held that negligent conduct might be legal malpractice but is not a
violation of the DTPA.72 Tolpo's allegations thus did not support an in-
dependent cause of action under the DTPA separate from a malpractice
cause of action, and summary judgment on the DTPA claim was proper.7 3
Willowbrook Foods, Inc. v. Grinnell Corp.74 arose from a fire originat-
ing in a turkey fryer that spread and damaged a turkey processing plant
and its contents. The owners and operators of the processing plant
brought an action for strict liability based on defective design, manufac-
ture and marketing, breach of warranty, negligence, and DTPA viola-
tions. Emerson, a supplier of a component part of the turkey fryer,
moved for summary judgment on the DTPA claims on the grounds that
there was no evidence of any false, misleading, or deceptive act on Emer-
63. Id.
64. Id. at 565-66.
65. 146 S.W.3d 678 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2004, no pet. h.).
66. Id. at 679.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 681.
69. Id. at 683.
70. Id. at 685.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 681-83, 685.
74. 147 S.W.3d 492 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2004, pet. filed).
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son's part. The trial court granted the motion and the plaintiffs ap-
pealed.7 5 The San Antonio Court of Appeals reviewed the plaintiffs'
response to the summary judgment motion, in which the plaintiffs
claimed that Emerson failed to advise or warn them of the proper use of
its product.7 6 For example, the plaintiffs alleged that Emerson did not
recommend certain safety measures and failed to indicate the critical ef-
fects of sensor contamination.7 7 The court found, however, that Emer-
son's mere nondisclosure of material information was not enough to
establish an actionable DTPA claim. To establish a violation of the
DTPA, the plaintiffs needed to show that Emerson had knowledge of the
undisclosed information and intentionally withheld it. In addition, the
plaintiffs were required to show that the information was withheld with
the intent of inducing the consumer to engage in a transaction. 78 The
court concluded that the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover damages
for nondisclosure under the DTPA, because they failed to raise a genuine
issue of material fact on the elements of the claim.
79
B. UNCONSCIONABILITY
Section 17.45(5) of the DTPA defines an "unconscionable action or
course of action" as "an act or practice which, to a consumer's detriment,
takes advantage of the lack of knowledge, ability, experience, or capacity
of the consumer to a grossly unfair degree."' 80 In Allstate Texas Lloyds v.
Mason,81 Allstate sent its insureds a letter stating it would attempt to give
them "every advantage" of their policy. The homeowners argued that
Allstate was not interested granting the benefits due to them but instead
was interested in performing a sham investigation of their foundation
damage claim with the purpose of denying the claim regardless of the
consequences. 82 The court held that Allstate did not perform an unrea-
sonable investigation and did not violate its duty of good faith and fair
dealing.83 Accordingly, there was no evidence of unconscionable conduct
on Allstate's part.84
75. Id. at 495-96.
76. Id. at 506.
77. Id. at 507.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 495, 506-07.
80. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(5) (Vernon 2002).
81. 123 S.W.3d 690 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). Allstate Texas Lloyds was
discussed in note 44 and the accompanying text.
82. Id. at 706.
83. Id.
84. Id.; see also E.R. Dupuis Concrete Co. v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 137 S.W.3d 311
(Tex. App.-Beaumont 2004, no pet. h.) (holding that investor's allegations that insurance
agents attended the same church as insured, obtained insured's trust by showing him how




C. INCORPORATION OF THE DTPA INTO THE TEXAS
INSURANCE CODE
Several statutes incorporate sections of the DTPA or permit recovery
for their violation via the DTPA.85 One of the most frequently invoked
of these "borrowing" statutes is article 21.21 of the Texas Insurance
Code. 86 Although the DTPA laundry list is not exclusive for DTPA pur-
poses, it is exclusive for deceptive practices claims under the Insurance
Code. 87
In Perez v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Texas, Inc.,88 the Austin Court of
Appeals considered whether Blue Cross's denial of coverage constituted
sufficient evidence of a DTPA violation to survive summary judgment.
Debra Perez applied to Blue Cross for an individual health insurance pol-
icy for herself and her son, Brandon. She stated on the application that
her son had Down Syndrome but was very healthy. Blue Cross provided
coverage for Debra but excluded Brandon because of his Down Syn-
drome. Brandon, through his mother, sued Blue Cross individually and
on behalf of similarly situated individuals alleging that Blue Cross's policy
of denying coverage to healthy persons with Down Syndrome violated
the Insurance Code and DTPA section 17.46(b)(12). The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of Blue Cross and Brandon ap-
pealed.89 The Austin Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that section
17.46(b)(12) requires evidence that the defendant represented "that an
agreement confers or involves rights, remedies, or obligations which it
does not have or involve, or which are prohibited by law." 90 Blue Cross
made no promise of coverage in the application and instead specifically
stated that coverage was subject to approval by Blue Cross.91 Because
there was no evidence that Blue Cross made any misrepresentations, the
court affirmed summary judgment in favor of Blue Cross. 92
Dallas Fire Insurance Co. v. Texas Contractors Surety & Casualty
Agency 93 involved a dispute over commissions to be paid under an agency
agreement. Texas Contractors Surety and Casualty Agency ("TCSCA")
85. Statutes either incorporating provisions of the DTPA or permitting recovery for
their violation via the DTPA include: TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. §§ 351.604, 702.403 (Vernon
2004); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.007 (Vernon 2000); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 59.005,
221.024, 221.071, 222.011 (Vernon 1995); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 35.74(c)
(Vernon 2002); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 164.013 (Vernon 2001); TEX. INS.
CODE art. 21.21 (Vernon 1981); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 9020 (Vernon 1981); and TEX.
TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 684.086 (Vernon 1999).
86. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21.
87. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Watson, 876 S.W.2d 145, 149 (Tex. 1994).
88. 127 S.W.3d 826 (Tex. App.-Austin 2003, pet. denied).
89. Id. at 829-30.
90. Id. at 835 (quoting TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(12) (Vernon 2002)).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Dallas Fire Ins. Co. v. Tex. Contractors Sur. & Cas. Agency, 159 S.W.3d 895 (Tex.
2004). Although the Texas Supreme Court's opinion was issued just after the close of the
Survey period, the opinion is treated in this Survey because it reversed an opinion by the
Fort Worth Court of Appeals released during the Survey period.
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was formed to sell contract surety bonds. TCSCA agreed with Dallas
Fire Insurance Company to the terms of a subagency agreement including
a commission structure. Dallas Fire subsequently changed the manner of
calculating TCSCA's commissions retroactively to the beginning of the
parties' relationship in a manner that significantly limited further com-
missions and resulted in a claim by Dallas Fire for reimbursement for
certain previously paid commissions. TCSCA sued and the case was tried
to a jury on TCSCA's claims of breach of contract and Insurance Code
violations based on misrepresentations by Dallas Fire in violation of
DTPA section 17.46(b)(12) and on counterclaims by Dallas Fire. The
jury found that Dallas Fire knowingly misrepresented the rights, reme-
dies, or obligations of the parties and awarded damages to TCSCA.
94
On appeal, Dallas Fire argued that the parties' dispute did not arise out
of the "business of insurance" because TCSCA only sold contract surety
bonds.95 The Fort Worth Court of Appeals disagreed holding that, al-
though the Texas Supreme Court had held that the relationship between
a surety and its obligee was not covered by article 21.21 of the Insurance
Code, 96 the case before the court did not involve such a relationship. In-
stead, the court noted that surety bonds are insurance products for pur-
poses of Insurance Code provisions relating to agent licensure and that
TCSCA's principals were required to be licensed as insurance agents to
sell surety bonds.97 The court concluded that it was obliged to construe
article 21.21 liberally and that, as a matter of law, the dispute between
TCSCA and Dallas Fire arose out of the "business of insurance."
98
The Texas Supreme Court reversed and rendered judgment for Dallas
Fire, holding that although surety bonds are insurance products for pur-
poses of Insurance Code provisions relating to agent licensure, the Insur-
ance Code defines the "business of insurance" differently in multiple
sections of the code, and TCSCA's claims did not arise in context of the
licensure requirements. 99 The court held that the Fort Worth Court of
Appeals had interpreted Great American Insurance Co. too narrowly and
that the holding applied to suretyship generally, not only to suits between
sureties and their bondholders. 100 The Texas Supreme Court concluded
that "suretyship, as historically understood in the insurance and surety-
ship fields, does not constitute the business of insurance under article
21.21." 101 Thus, because TCSCA's claims involved the business of surety-
ship, not the business of insurance, the court rendered judgment that TC-
94. Id. at 896.
95. Id.
96. See Great Am. Ins. Co. v. N. Austin Util. Dist. No. 1, 908 S.W.2d 415, 424 (Tex.
1994).
97. Dallas Fire Ins. Co., 128 S.W.3d 279, 291 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004), rev'd, 159
S.W.3d 895 (Tex. 2004).
98. Id. at 289-90.
99. Dallas Fire Ins. Co., 157 S.W.3d at 896-97.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 897.
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SCA take nothing on its claims under article 21.21.102
IV. DETERMINING THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES
A prevailing plaintiff in a DTPA action may recover economic dam-
ages. 10 3 In cases involving misrepresentation, the plaintiff may recover
under either the "out of pocket" or "benefit of the bargain" measure of
damages, whichever gives the plaintiff a greater recovery. 10 4 If the trier
of fact finds that the defendant acted "knowingly," the plaintiff also may
recover damages for mental anguish and additional statutory damages up
to three times the amount of economic damages. 10 5
A. EVIDENCE OF DAMAGES
Ford Motor Co. v. Cooper'0 6 arose from the sale of a new 1998 Lincoln
Town Car from Crane Lincoln Mercury. After experiencing a steering
problem with the vehicle, Cooper sued Crane and Ford alleging breach of
warranty and DTPA violations. Cooper testified that, in the car's dam-
aged condition, it was worthless for taking long trips, which was the pur-
pose for which he purchased it. The jury found in favor of Cooper and
awarded $5,000 for diminished value of the vehicle, $1,000 for expenses,
and additional damages based upon a finding of knowing conduct. The
trial court reduced the award and rendered judgment for $18,000.107
On appeal, Crane and Ford argued that the evidence was legally insuf-
ficient to support the award of actual damages. 10 8 The Texarkana Court
of Appeals agreed. 109 Cooper pled for the difference between the fair
market value of the car as sold and the value as warranted and repre-
sented." 0 The court held that evidence of the negotiated price for the
new car established its value as warranted and represented."1 The only
evidence of the value as sold, however, was Cooper's own testimony." 12
Citing the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Porras v. Craig,113 the Tex-
arkana Court of Appeals explained that an owner of property can testify
as to its market value as long as the testimony shows that it refers to
market value, rather than some other value of the property." 4 Because
Cooper's testimony referred to the value of the car to him, and did not
reference the car's market value, the testimony constituted no evi-
102. Id.
103. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(1) (Vernon 2002).
104. Leyendecker & Assocs. v. Wechter, 683 S.W.2d 369, 373 (Tex. 1984).
105. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(1) (Vernon 2002).
106. 125 S.W.3d 794 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2004, no pet. h.).
107. Id. at 796.
108. Id. at 799.
109. Id. at 803.
110. Id. at 799.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 803.
113. 675 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. 1984).
114. Ford Motor Co., 129 S.W.3d at 799.
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dence. 115 Given the jury's findings of breach of warranty and knowing
violations of the DTPA, the court held that the interests of justice re-
quired a remand for a new trial.116
The San Antonio Court of Appeals also considered an owner's testi-
mony regarding damages. In Lefton v. Griffith,117 a lessor of property
sued the owners for breach of contract, tortious interference, fraud, inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, and DTPA violations. Dixie Grif-
fith leased a tract of property owned by David and Arthur Lefton for use
as a furniture store. When Griffith was unable to pay her rent, the
Leftons allegedly agreed to give her time to vacate; but instead of keep-
ing their promise, they changed the locks and refused to give her access
to the property except for two weekend days. Griffith sued, alleging that
she was forced to sell her inventory at a loss, was forced to sell her home
to pay her creditors, and suffered damage to her credit reputation and
mental anguish. When the Leftons failed to answer the suit, the trial
court granted Griffith's motion for default judgment and entered judg-
ment in favor of Griffith on her DTPA claim, awarding treble economic
damages, treble mental anguish damages, and attorneys' fees. The
Leftons filed a restricted appeal under Texas Rule of Appellate Proce-
dure 30, arguing that the evidence of damages was legally and factually
insufficient. 118
Griffith provided evidence of damages in an affidavit. The Leftons first
argued that Griffith's affidavit was incompetent, because it failed to refer
to market value, rather than personal value." 9 The court of appeals re-
jected this argument, holding that Griffith's testimony did not affirma-
tively show that she was referring to personal rather than market
value. °20 The Leftons also argued that Griffith's testimony was incompe-
tent because it was conclusory. 121 The court agreed, holding that con-
clusory allegations will not support an award of unliquidated damages.122
Because Griffith failed to establish the value of the inventory she sold
and failed to explain how she arrived at the conclusion that she lost
$60,000 on the sale of her home, the evidence was insufficient to support
those elements of damage. 123 Similarly, because Griffith failed to allege
that she was denied a loan or charged a higher interest rate, the court
held that she could not recover damages for loss of credit reputation. 124
Finally, because Griffith's affidavit merely stated an amount of profits she
expected to have made based solely on past profits, the court held that
she failed to provide sufficient data to determine her lost profits with
115. Id.
116. Id. at 805.
117. 136 S.W.3d 271 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2004, no pet. h.).
118. Id. at 273-74.





124. Id. at 277-78.
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reasonable certainty. 125 The court of appeals therefore remanded the
case for a new trial on damages. 126
In Barnett v. Coppell North Texas Court, Ltd.,127 discussed above,
David and Wanda Lewis contracted with Barnett to build a gymnastics
complex. The Lewises and Barnett brought claims against each other,
which the jury resolved in favor of the Lewises. Barnett appealed arguing
in part that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support
the jury's award of damages. 128
The Dallas Court of Appeals reviewed the evidence and held that the
jury's award was supported by sufficient evidence. 129 There was ample
evidence in the record that the Lewises incurred substantial costs in con-
nection with the project, including up front costs for the construction.1 30
Additionally, the evidence demonstrated that: the Lewises relied on Bar-
nett's representations regarding the amount of time for construction, did
not renew the lease on their existing gymnastics center, and had to rent
and improve a temporary site.131 The Lewises also presented evidence of
lost profits.132 David Lewis testified that he is a gymnastics instructor
and teacher and owned and operated a successful gymnastics center for
three years before contracting with Barnett, and, in light of the growth of
that business, his conservative estimate of profits going forward was be-
tween $150,000 and $180,000 per annum.133 The court held that this testi-
mony demonstrated that Lewis was familiar with the business and had
based his estimate on the trend in the industry and the specific area
where the business was located. 1
34
B. ATTORNEYS' FEES
A consumer who prevails on a DTPA claim is entitled to an award of
reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees.135 The plaintiff in Blue Star
Operating Co. v. Tetra Technologies, Inc.,136 obtained a jury finding that
the defendant knowingly failed to perform services in a good and work-
manlike manner, but the jury found that the plaintiff's damages were
zero. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that it was entitled to recover its
attorneys' fees as a prevailing DTPA plaintiff.137 The Dallas Court of
Appeals disagreed, holding that a party is not entitled to recover attor-
125. Id.
126. Id. at 278.
127. 123 S.W.3d 804 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, pet. denied). Barnett is also discussed at
note 50 and accompanying text.
128. Id. at 813.
129. Id. at 826.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 826-27.
132. Id. at 827-28.
133. ld.
134. Id. at 828.
135. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(d) (Vernon 2002).
136. 119 S.W.3d 916 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, pet. denied).
137. Id. at 922.
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neys' fees if the jury did not award any damages.1 38
C. MENTAL ANGUISH DAMAGES
The San Antonio Court of Appeals considered the amount of evidence
necessary to support an award of mental anguish damages in Lefton v.
Griffith.139 The plaintiff presented affidavit testimony that, as a result of
the defendants' conduct, she "suffered severe emotional distress and
mental anguish as a result of numerous encounters with angry, frustrated
customers." She claimed she "was unable to sleep, was depressed, and
suffered from anxiety. '1 40 She concluded that her damages for emotional
and mental anguish equaled the damages for the loss of her business.1 41
The court of appeals held that "[m]ental anguish damages are appropri-
ate when there is either 'direct evidence of the nature, duration, and se-
verity of [plaintiffs'] mental anguish, thus establishing a substantial
disruption in the plaintiffs' daily routine,' or other evidence of 'a high
degree of mental pain and distress' that is 'more than mere worry, anxi-
ety, vexation, or anger."'1 42 The court further held that there must be
evidence to justify the amount awarded. 143 Examining the evidence, the
court concluded that Griffith failed to establish the duration of her
anguish and failed to establish that she suffered a high degree of mental
pain and distress. 1a The court also concluded that Griffith failed to show
that the damages she sought were a fair and reasonable amount for the
mental anguish she suffered. 145
In Jabri v. Alsayyed,146 discussed above, the lessee of a convenience
store sued Jabri and his corporation for fraud and DTPA violations, alleg-
ing that Jabri told Alsayyed that the convenience store was an ongoing
business with a good consumer base that would generate profits of about
$10,000 per month. The jury found in favor of Alsayyed and awarded
mental anguish damages. 147
On appeal, Jabri and the corporation argued that the evidence was in-
sufficient to support a finding of mental anguish damages. To support his
mental anguish claim, Alsayyed testified that the sale of the business and
Jabri's intent that Alsayyed take over the operations of the store regu-
larly placed him in harm's way and he feared for his life. Among other
facts, Alsayyed testified that the front door of the store would not lock;
138. Id.
139. 136 S.W.3d 271 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2004, no pet. h.). Lefton is also dis-
cussed at note 119 and accompanying text.
140. Id. at 278-79.
141. Id. at 279.





146. 145 S.W.3d 660 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet. h.). Jabri is also
discussed at note 27 and accompanying text.
147. Id. at 665.
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the store was frequented by prostitutes, drug dealers, and vagrants; a
murder occurred in the store while he was operating it; he was robbed at
gunpoint; and there were several late night burglaries of the store.148 The
Houston Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff must show direct evidence
of the nature, duration, or severity of the anguish or other evidence of
emotional distress that amounts to more than mere worry, anxiety, vexa-
tion, embarrassment, or anger.149 The court found that Alsayyed's fear
stemmed from the high crime in the area, not from misrepresentations
regarding the profitability of the business.' 50 The court concluded that
the evidence was insufficient to support an award of mental anguish
damages. 151
V. EXEMPTIONS, DEFENSES, AND LIMITATIONS
ON RECOVERY
The DTPA has been characterized as a "strict liability" statute, requir-
ing only proof of a misrepresentation, without regard to the offending
party's intent.152 This is only partially correct, as several DTPA provi-
sions expressly require proof of intentional conduct. 153 Some courts have
gone so far as holding that common law defenses, such as estoppel and
ratification, are not available to combat DTPA claims. 154 Other courts
have recognized a variety of defenses to DTPA claims.' 55 Additionally,
both the courts and the legislature have carved out exemptions from the
DTPA's reach.
A. EXEMPTIONS WITHIN THE DTPA
Section 17.49 of the DTPA contains several exemptions from the Act's
reach. During the Survey period, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals ex-
amined the exemption for transactions involving total consideration of
148. Id. at 669.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 670.
152. See, e.g., White Budd Van Ness P'ship v. Major-Gladys Drive Joint Venture, 798
S.W.2d 805, 809 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1990, writ dism'd) (rejecting appellant's strict lia-
bility contention).
153. See, e.g., TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(9), (10), (13), (16), (17), (24)
(Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2004-05).
154. See, e.g., Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Morris, 928 S.W.2d 133, 154 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1996, writ granted), affd in part, rev'd in part, 981 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1998); see
also Smith v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611, 616 (Tex. 1980) (recognizing that a primary purpose
of the DTPA was to relieve consumers of common law defenses while providing a cause of
action for misrepresentation).
155. See, e.g., Ostrow v. United Bus. Machs., Inc., 982 S.W.2d 101, 105 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.) ("We hold a DTPA claim arising out of a contract may be
barred by accord and satisfaction."); Johnson v. McLeaish, 1995 WL 500308, at *10 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1995, writ denied) (not designated for publication) (applying illegality/public
policy affirmative defense to DTPA claims); Keriotis v. Lombardo Rental Trust, 607




more than $500,000.156 Citizens National Bank v. Allen Rae Investments,
Inc.,157 involved a construction loan from Citizens National Bank
("CNB") made to Allen Rae Investments, Inc. ("ARI") and upon which
ARI defaulted. ARI brought an action against CNB, among other de-
fendants, for fraud, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and DTPA
violations. The trial court entered judgment in favor of ARI. 158 The Fort
Worth Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the trial court abused its
discretion in submitting the DTPA question to the jury. 159 CNB argued
that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing ARI to recover under
the DTPA because ARI's hotel project involved a total consideration of
more than $500,000; under DTPA section 17.49(g), the DTPA did not
apply. ARI contended that, because CNB advanced only $463,193 under
its $600,000 note, the DTPA did apply. 160 In this case of first impression,
the Forth Worth Court of Appeals concluded that ARI's overall consider-
ation exceeded $500,000 on the hotel project, and because the project did
not involve a consumer's residence, the DTPA did not apply.161 Accord-
ingly, the trial court abused it discretion in submitting the DTPA jury
question and in allowing the corporation to recover from the bank under
the DTPA. 162
B. PREEMPTION AND EXEMPTION FROM THE DTPA
Certain statutory schemes and common law doctrines bar DTPA claims
either expressly or by implication or affect a plaintiff's procedures for
bringing DTPA claims. During the Survey period, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Texas examined one such limitation
on the DTPA's reach. In Franyutti v. Hidden Valley Moving and Stor-
age,163 the plaintiff hired May Flower Transit, an authorized agent of Hid-
den Valley Moving and Storage, to move his household goods to San
Antonio from California. Upon arrival, Hidden Valley allegedly charged
the plaintiff a higher amount than that orally agreed upon and delivered
the goods several days late. The plaintiff sued in state court alleging com-
mon law fraud and DTPA violations. The defendant removed the action
to federal court, contending that the plaintiff's claims were preempted
because the action involved tariff charges for the interstate shipment of
goods and that the Interstate Commerce Act, including the Carmack
Amendment, precluded the plaintiff's claims. 164 The district court held
that the plaintiff's claims arose under federal law. 165 The court relied on
a recent Fifth Circuit opinion holding that the Carmack Amendment pro-
156. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.49(g) (Vernon 2002).
157. 142 S.W.3d 459 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet. h.).
158. Id. at 467-69.
159. Id. at 474.
160. Id. at 473; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.49(g) (Vernon 2002).
161. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 142 S.W.3d at 474.
162. Id.
163. 325 F. Supp. 2d 775 (W.D. Tex. 2004).
164. Id. at 776.
165. Id. at 778.
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vides the exclusive cause of action for loss or damage to goods arising
from interstate transportation by common carrier.166 Although that opin-
ion applied complete preemption to claims involving loss or damage to
goods, the district court noted that the Fifth Circuit had itself relied upon
an earlier Fifth Circuit opinion holding that the Carmack Amendment
provides the exclusive remedy for breach of contract of carriage provided
by a bill of lading.167 The district court concluded that "the Carmack
Amendment provides the exclusive cause of action for any claim arising
out of the interstate transportation of household goods."'
1 68
C. NECESSITY OF PROVING RELIANCE
To recover under section 17.50 of the DTPA for a laundry list violation,
a consumer must prove that the false, misleading, or deceptive act or
practice was the producing cause of damages and that the consumer re-
lied upon the act or practice. 169
The Waco Court of Appeals considered the element of reliance in
O'Connor v. Miller.170 O'Connor purchased used airplane engines and
complained that the condition of the engines had been misrepresented.
The case was tried to a jury, which was asked whether the defendants
engaged in "any false, misleading, or deceptive act or practice that Rob-
ert O'Connor relied on to his detriment and that was a producing cause
of damages to Robert O'Connor.' 71 The jury found against O'Connor
and the trial court entered a take-nothing judgment. 172
On appeal, the Waco Court of Appeals framed its analysis as whether
the plaintiff had relied on allegedly false information in spec sheets given
by the sellers. 173 The court assumed-without discussion or citation to
case law-that reliance was a necessary element of O'Connor's case.
174
The court held that the spec sheets contained obvious discrepancies, and
if O'Connor relied upon them, he would have noticed the discrepancies
and asked for clarification. 75 In addition, there was evidence that relying
solely on spec sheets is risky and that the condition and authenticity of
some engine parts cannot be verified without totally disassembling the
166. Id. at 777 (citing Hoskins v. Bekins Van Lines, 343 F.3d 769, 778 (5th Cir. 2003)).
167. Id. (citing Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Ill. Central Gulf R.R. Co., 721 F.2d 483,
484-85 (5th Cir. 1983)).
168. Id. at 778.
169. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(1)(A)-(B) (Vernon 2002). Despite the
plain language of section 17.50, which was amended in 1995 to require reliance, some
courts continue to cite pre-amendment caselaw for the proposition that reliance is not an
element of a DTPA claim. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Altman, No. 07-02-0370-CV, 2004
WL 350991, at *3 (Tex. App.-Amarillo Feb. 25, 2004, pet. denied); James V. Mazuca &
Assocs. v. Schumann, 82 S.W.3d 90, 95 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, pet. denied) (en
banc).
170. 127 S.W.3d 249 (Tex. App.-Waco 2003, pet. denied).
171. Id. at 256.
172. Id. at 253.





engines, which did not occur.176 Because there was evidence from which
the jury could have reasonably determined that O'Connor did not rely on
the information in the spec sheets, the court held that the jury's failure to
find a DTPA violation was not so against the great weight and preponder-
ance of the evidence that it was clearly unjust. 177
In McLaughlin, Inc. v. Northstar Drilling Technologies, Inc.,178 a direc-
tional boring and utility contractor entered into a contract with Northstar
Drilling Technologies for directional drilling guidance services and equip-
ment at three job sites. Northstar charged McLaughlin for each job but
McLaughlin only paid for one job. Northstar sued McLaughlin for pay-
ment for the two other jobs and McLaughlin counterclaimed, alleging
that Northstar failed to properly perform the guidance services and that
Northstar's promotional literature contained misrepresentations. Mc-
Laughlin asserted claims for breach of contract, breach of warranties, and
DTPA violations. After a bench trial, the trial court awarded damages to
Northstar and denied all of McLaughlin's counterclaims and McLaughlin
appealed.179 The San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
judgment. 180 The court held that the record established that McLaughlin
hired Northstar based upon a friend's recommendation and did not rely
on Northstar's promotional literature. Absent reliance, McLaughlin
could not maintain a DTPA cause of action.181
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals considered the reliance element
of a DTPA claim in two consolidated cases in Ford Motor Co. v.
Ocanas.182 Both cases arose from allegations that the Ford F-150 with
optional towing package was marketed as having a larger radiator than F-
150s without the towing package, but that the trucks as delivered did not
have the larger radiator. The trial court certified both a Texas class and a
nationwide class on claims of breach of express warranties, breach of im-
plied warranties of merchantability, and DTPA violations.1 83 On inter-
locutory appeal of the class certifications, Ford argued that individual
issues predominated over common questions of fact and the Corpus
Christi Court of Appeals agreed.18 4 Citing the Texas Supreme Court's
opinion in Henry Schein, Inc. v. Stromboe,18 5 the court of appeals held
that both DTPA laundry list violation claims and claims of breach of ex-
press warranties require proof of reliance.18 6 Thus, each class member
had to prove reliance upon Ford's alleged misrepresentations.1 87
176. Id.
177. Id. at 258.
178. 138 S.W.3d 24 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2004, no pet. h.).
179. Id. at 26-27.
180. Id. at 31.
181. Id. at 30.
182. 138 S.W.3d 447 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2004, no pet. h.).
183. Id. at 449-50.
184. Id. at 454.
185. 102 S.W.3d 675 (Tex. 2002).




D. NECESSITY OF PROVING CAUSATION
Liability under the DTPA is limited to conduct that is a producing
cause of the plaintiff's damages. 18 8 Unlike the doctrine of proximate
cause, producing cause does not require that the injury be foreseeable.1 8 9
"Producing cause" is defined as "'an efficient, exciting, or contributing
cause, which in a natural sequence, produced injuries or damages com-
plained of. . . '"'190 When determining whether the actions complained
of are a producing cause of a plaintiff's damages, courts look to whether
the alleged cause is a substantial factor that brings about the plaintiff's
injury, without which the injury would not have occurred.' 91
The Houston Court of Appeals applied the concept of producing cause
in Carousel's Creamery, L.L.C. v. Marble Slab Creamery, Inc.,192 which
arose from Marble Slab Creamery's desire to increase the size of its
franchise system. In the mid-1990s, Marble Slab distributed a Uniform
Franchise Operating Circular ("UFOC") to potential franchisees. The
UFOC contained representations regarding two company-owned stores.
Carousel began investing in Marble Slab franchises. It eventually owned
several Marble Slab stores but financial losses forced them to close. Car-
ousel sued Marble Slab alleging fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and
DTPA violations, contending that the UFOCs it obtained from Marble
Slab misrepresented the value of the franchise. Marble Slab counter-
claimed for breach of contract. The case was tried to a jury, which found
against Carousel on its fraud and DTPA claims and awarded Marble Slab
damages on its breach of contract claim; Carousel appealed.
193
The Houston Court of Appeals affirmed.' 94 The court found that there
was sufficient evidence that Marble Slab's representations were neither a
cause in fact nor a "substantial factor" in causing Carousel's injuries. 195
Marble Slab presented evidence that the Carousel investors made numer-
ous mistakes and errors of business judgment. For example, the Carousel
investors did very little investigation or preparation before purchasing
their stores, and they ignored red flags in the financial data they did re-
view. Marble Slab's expert witnesses opined that Carousel's reliance on
the UFOC was unreasonable and that the UFOC contained caveats that a
reasonable investor would heed. Marble Slab also presented evidence
that Carousel's business was poorly managed.' 96 Although Carousel
presented testimony inconsistent with Marble Slab's evidence, the court
188. Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 472, 478 (Tex. 1995).
189. See Hycel, Inc. v. Wittstruck, 690 S.W.2d 914, 922 (Tex. App.-Waco 1985, writ
dism'd).
190. Union Pump Co. v. Albritton, 898 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex. 1995) (quoting Rourke v.
Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794, 801 (Tex. 1975)).
191. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Jefferson Assocs., 896 S.W.2d 156, 161 (Tex. 1995).
192. 134 S.W.3d 385 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. granted).
193. Id. at 389-90. The trial court granted Marble Slab's motion for directed verdict
with respect to the negligent misrepresentation claim. Id. at 390.
194. Id. at 405.
195. Id. at 402-03.
196. Id. at 400.
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held that the jury is the sole judge of the witnesses' credibility and the
weight to be given to their testimony.197 Therefore, the court concluded
that Carousel was unable to recover on its DTPA claim. 198
E. "As Is" CLAUSES
An "as is" agreement generally negates the causation element of a
DTPA claim. 19 9 In Bynum v. Prudential Residential Services, Ltd. Part-
nership,2 0 0 the plaintiffs were home purchasers who brought claims
against their direct seller, which had provided home relocation services to
the prior homeowner, and against the prior homeowners and their re-
modeling contractor. The contract between the plaintiffs and the direct
seller stated, "Buyer accepts the Property in its present condition.
2 0 1
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. 20 2
On appeal, the defendants argued that the quoted language from the
contract negated the causation element of a DTPA claim. The plaintiffs
first argued that the "as is" clause and other similar disclaimers were not
binding because the disclaimers were inconspicuous boiler-plate provi-
sions and the plaintiffs lacked sophistication in purchasing property or
reviewing contracts. 20 3 The Houston Court of Appeals rejected this argu-
ment because the plaintiffs were represented in the transaction by a li-
censed real estate broker, they had prior experience with "as is"
purchases, and they admitted being aware of the "as is" clause.20 4 The
plaintiffs next argued that the disclaimers were the result of fraudulent
concealment, but the court of appeals held that there was no evidence
that the defendants had actual knowledge of any misrepresentations
about the home.20 5
The plaintiffs also argued that even if the "as is" clause was enforcea-
ble, it did not waive their claims under the DTPA because the "as is"
clause did not comply with the DTPA's waiver requirements. 20 6 Relying
upon the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Prudential Insurance Co. of
America v. Jefferson Associates,20 7 the court of appeals held that the
waiver provisions in the DTPA were inapplicable because an "as is"
clause is a statement that no basis exists for the assertion of a DTPA
claim, it is not a waiver of DTPA rights.20 8 The court concluded that the
''as is" clause was the proper basis for summary judgment against the
197. Id. at 403.
198. Id.
199. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Jefferson Assocs., 898 S.W.2d 156, 161 (Tex. 1995).
200. 129 S.W.3d 781 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied).
201. Id. at 787.
202. Id. at 785.
203. Id. at 788-89.
204. Id. at 789.
205. Id. at 792.
206. Id.
207. 898 S.W.2d 156, 163-64 (Tex. 1995).
208. Bynum, 129 S.W.3d at 792.
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plaintiffs on their DTPA claims. 209 Finally, the plaintiffs argued that the
"as is" clause did not bind their minor children because the children did
not have capacity to contract and were not parties to the agreement. 210
The court of appeals rejected this argument, holding that a third-party
beneficiary generally will not have greater rights under a contract than
the party who bargained for their benefit. 211 Thus, although a third-party
beneficiary can have standing to assert a cause of action under the DTPA
if the transaction was intended to benefit the third party, there was no
authority for the proposition that an intended beneficiary of a contract
would not be bound by the terms of that contract.212
F. A "MERE" BREACH OF CONTRACT IS NOT ACTIONABLE UNDER
THE DTPA
A breach of contract without misrepresentation or fraud is not a false,
misleading, or deceptive act; therefore, it does not violate the DTPA.213
The Beaumont Court of Appeals applied this principle in Conquest Drill-
ing Fluids, Inc. v. Tri-Flo International, Inc. 214 The plaintiff purchased
oilfield equipment that allegedly never functioned. Conquest sued Tri-
Flo, asserting claims of negligence, negligent misrepresentation, breach of
contract, breach of warranty, and DTPA violations. The trial court
granted summary judgment to Tri-Flo on the DTPA, negligence, and neg-
ligent misrepresentation claims, and a jury returned a verdict for Con-
quest on the breach of contract and breach of warranty claims. Both
parties appealed. 215
In its summary judgment motion on Conquest's DTPA claims, Tri-Flo
argued that the claims were nothing more than breach of contract claims.
One group of DTPA claims was premised on Tri-Flo's alleged failure to
fulfill its promise that the equipment would have certain characteristics,
benefits, and uses; would be a particular standard, quality, or grade;
would be of good quality; and would be free of defects in material and
workmanship. 216 The Beaumont Court of Appeals held that this group of
claims was, in substance, merely a claim that Tri-Flo did not comply with
the contract and summary judgment was proper.217 Conquest also al-
leged that Tri-Flo advertised goods or services with the intent not to sell
them as advertised and failed to disclose information concerning the
equipment with the intent to induce Conquest into a transaction that it
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 793.
212. Id.
213. Ashford Dev., Inc. v. USLife Real Estate Serv. Corp., 661 S.W.2d 933, 935 (Tex.
1983); Quitta v. Fossati, 808 S.W.2d 636, 644 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ
denied).
214. 137 S.W.3d 299 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2004, no pet. h.).
215. Id. at 301-02.
216. ld. at 309.
217. Id.
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would not have entered into had the information been disclosed. 218 The
court held that a duty not to illegally procure a contract is independent
from the duties established by the contract.219 Because these two claims
did not merely allege a breach of contract, the court reversed the grant of
summary judgment on the claims.220
G. LIMITATIONS PERIOD
Under the DTPA's limitations provision, an action must be com-
menced within two years after the date on which the false, misleading, or
deceptive act or practice occurred or within two years after the consumer
discovered, or should have discovered, the occurrence of the false, mis-
leading, or deceptive act or practice. 221 Generally, when a DTPA cause
of action accrues is a question of law.
222
Last year's Survey reported on Knott v. Provident Life and Accident
Insurance Co.,223 in which a physician sued an insurer and its agent alleg-
ing that they had misled him regarding the terms of two disability insur-
ance policies. The plaintiff sustained a fracture to his spine in 1985. He
was unable to work for two months and, although he returned to his prac-
tice, there were some procedures that he was unable to perform. He ini-
tially applied for total disability benefits under the policies in 1985, but
the claim was denied in 1986. The plaintiff did not contest that denial. In
1996, he filed a second claim for total disability benefits. The insurer paid
the benefits for twenty-four months and then terminated payment. The
plaintiff sued, alleging that the termination of benefits constituted bad
faith and breach of the insurance contract and alleging that the insurance
agent had misrepresented the terms of the policies. The agent moved for
summary judgment on the ground that the claims were barred by limita-
tions. The trial court granted the motion.224 In the decision reported last
year, the Eastland Court of Appeals affirmed. 225 The court rejected the
plaintiff's argument that his cause of action did not accrue until his bene-
fits were terminated in 1998.226 The plaintiff claimed that he had been
continuously disabled since the accident in 1985.227 The court stated that
if the plaintiff's claims of misrepresentation were correct, the initial de-
nial of benefits was improper. 228 The court found that due to the initial
denial of benefits, the plaintiff was authorized at that time to seek a judi-
218. Id.
219. Id. at 309-10.
220. Id. at 310.
221. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.565 (Vernon 2002).
222. Provident Life and Acc. Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 221 (Tex. 2003).
223. 70 S.W.3d 924 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2002, pet. granted), aff d in part, rev'd in part,
128 S.W.3d 211 (Tex. 2003).
224. Id. at 926-27, 933.
225. Id. at 926-27, 932-33.
226. Id. at 933.




cial remedy and the statute of limitation had long since expired.22 9
The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment re-
garding limitations.230 The court held that all of the plaintiff's extra-con-
tractual claims accrued upon the denial of his claim for total disability
under the policies. 231 Citing its decision in Murray v. San Jacinto Agency,
Inc. ,232 the court stated that when there is no outright denial of an insur-
ance claim, the date of accrual should be a question of fact to be deter-
mined on a case-by-case basis.233 The court rejected the plaintiff's claim
that the 1986 letter did not constitute an outright denial of benefits, ex-
plaining that an insurer is not required to include "magic words" in its
denial of a claim; the insurer need only provide its determination of the
claim and the reasons for the determination in clear language. 234 Be-
cause the 1986 letter clearly conveyed the insurer's position that the
plaintiff was not entitled to total disability coverage, the letter triggered
the statue of limitations.2 35
In Gibson v. Ellis,236 the Dallas Court of Appeals applied DTPA limi-
tations to a claim arising from an attorney client relationship. Gibson and
his wife hired attorney Ellis to represent them in a personal injury suit
after their original attorney died. Ellis agreed to work under the former
attorney's contingency fee agreement. The Gibsons' personal injury
claims were settled, and Ellis deducted his attorneys' fees and some doc-
tors' bills from the proceeds. Gibson then sued Ellis complaining about
the deductions and Ellis's explanations for them and asserting claims for
breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, negligence, breach of contract, and DTPA
violations. The trial court held that Gibson's DTPA and negligence
claims were barred by limitations, and Gibson appealed.237
The Dallas Court of Appeals reviewed the summary judgment evi-
dence. The evidence included an affidavit from Gibson in which he ad-
mitted that as early as January 1995, he began to question whether Ellis's
explanation for the deductions from the settlement were true.2 38 By
March 1995, Gibson had been informed that the deductions for doctor's
bills were not covered by letters of protection on his settlement and had
consulted with an attorney who advised Gibson that Ellis might be liable
for malpractice. 239 The court rejected Gibson's argument that it was only
after he did legal research in September 1995 that he became aware of his
cause of action against Ellis, because Gibson clearly was aware of the
229. Id.
230. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 223 (Tex. 2003).
231. Id.
232. 800 S.W.2d 826, 828 n.2 (Tex. 1990).
233. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 128 S.W.3d at 222.
234. Id. at 222-23.
235. Id. at 233.
236. 126 S.W.3d 324 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, no pet. h.).
237. Id. at 328.
238. Id. at 331.
239. Id.
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factual basis of his claims in March 1995.240 The court also rejected Gib-
son's argument that Ellis's explanations for the deductions and denial of
wrongdoing prevented Gibson from discovering the facts supporting his
causes of action because, despite Ellis's explanations, Gibson continued
to question Ellis and consulted with an attorney regarding the
deductions. 241
VI. AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES TO DEFENDANT
Section 17.50(c) of the DTPA provides that a defendant is entitled to
recover its attorneys' fees incurred in defending against a DTPA claim if
the claim is "groundless and brought in bad faith, or for purposes of har-
assment. 2 42 Under section 17.50(c), "groundless" means a claim having
no basis in law or fact, and not warranted by any good faith argument for
the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. 243 In determining
whether a claim is groundless, a court should determine "whether the
totality of the tendered evidence demonstrates an arguable basis in fact
and law for the consumer's claim.' '2 44 A suit is brought in bad faith if it is
motivated by a malicious or discriminatory purpose. 245 Whether a suit is
groundless or brought in bad faith is a question of law. 2 46
The Dallas Court of Appeals examined this provision in Gibson v. El-
lis.247 As discussed above, Gibson and his wife hired Ellis to represent
them in a personal injury suit. Ellis deducted his attorneys' fees and
some doctors' bills from the settlement proceeds. Gibson sued, com-
plaining about the deductions and Ellis's explanations for them. After
Gibson's claims were resolved against him by summary judgment and a
jury trial, Ellis's counterclaim for attorneys' fees was tried before the
court; which awarded Ellis $41,000 in attorneys' fees. Gibson appealed,
arguing that "[t]here is room for good faith argument on both sides of the
issue as to when Gibson learned sufficient facts to end the tolling of limi-
tations." He also cited the appellate court's opinion reversing the trial
court's initial summary judgment.248
The Dallas Court of Appeals was "unpersuaded by Gibson's argu-
ments. '249 The record included evidence that Gibson had actually re-
quested Ellis to make the deductions, and that Gibson picketed Ellis's
before he filed the lawsuit, circulated a flyer critical of Ellis, changed the
240. Id.
241. Id. at 331-32.
242. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(c) (Vernon 2002).
243. Donwerth v. Preston II Chrysler-Dodge, Inc., 775 S.W.2d 634, 637 (Tex. 1989); see
TEX. R. Civ. P. 13.
244. Splettstosser v. Myer, 779 S.W.2d 806, 808 (Tex. 1989).
245. Cent. Tex. Hardware, Inc. v. First City, Texas-Bryan, N.A., 810 S.W.2d 234, 237
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied) (citing Knebel v. Port Enters., Inc.,
760 S.W.2d 829, 831 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied)).
246. Donwerth, 775 S.W.2d at 637.
247. 126 S.W.3d 324 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, no pet. h.).
248. Id. at 328, 335-36.
249. Id. at 336.
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greeting on his home telephone answering machine to one critical of El-
lis, and filed four grievances against Ellis with the State Bar of Texas.
250
Based on the record, the court of appeals held that the trial court had not
abused its discretion in finding Gibson's DTPA action was groundless and
brought in bad faith.251
VII. CONCLUSION
This was not a successful year for DTPA plaintiffs. Of the twenty-four
cases selected for discussion, plaintiffs lost eighteen on appeal. Of those,
six affirmed summary judgment for the defendant. In contrast, a plaintiff
secured a reversal of summary judgment in only two cases. The fact that
one-third of the twenty-four cases selected for review involved summary
disposition reflects an increased judicial willingness to dismiss questiona-
ble DTPA claims as a matter of law.
Another interesting trend evident in this year's crop of cases is the be-
lated judicial recognition that reliance is an element of a DTPA claim.
Although this has been the law since the legislature's 1995 amendment to
the statute, several courts have continued to incorrectly cite pre-1995 case
law for the proposition that reliance is not an element of a DTPA
claim.252 The fact that three courts during the Survey period managed to
avoid this error does not bode well for future DTPA plaintiffs. The
Corpus Christi Court of Appeal's decision in Ocanas253 is particularly
noteworthy because it suggests that, due to the individualized nature of




252. This is discussed in detail at note 171 and accompanying text.
253. Ocanas is discussed further at notes 184-89 and accompanying text.
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